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THE PUBLIC-USE REQUIREMENT IN WASHINGTON
AFTER STATE ex reL WASHINGTON STATE CONVENTION
& TRADE CENTER v. EVANS
Tim Benedict
Abstract: In State ex rel. Washington State Convention & Trade Center v. Evans, the
Supreme Court of Washington held that an exercise of eminent domain for a convention
center expansion project containing private developments utilizing most of the project's
developed space would not violate the Washington public-use requirement In so doing, the
court made the already confusing and contradictory Washington case law concerning public
use in the context of eminent domain even more unpredictable. This Note argues that the
court should have adopted a public-purpose analysis and thereby clarified the Washington
public-use requirement.
The Washington State Constitution limits the State's inherent power
of eminent domain by mandating that private property may not be taken
by the State for private use.! In an eminent domain action, the
Constitution charges the judiciary, not the legislature, with the task of
determining whether a proposed use for condemned property is public
rather than private.2 The Supreme Court of Washington has grappled for
almost one hundred years with the vexing question of what qualifies as a
public use. This labor has borne little fruit, and the Washington public-
use doctrine has been traditionally inconsistent and difficult to apply.
The principal confusion in the Washington public-use doctrine stems
from the Supreme Court of Washington's inability to apply a single
definition of public use consistently. In Washington and elsewhere, two
schools of thought exist concerning the meaning of public use. The first
theory, the so-called narrow approach, characterizes public use as "actual
use by the public" and requires that the public have an actual right of
access to the condemned property? The second theory, the broad
approach, defines public use more expansively as a mere requirement
that the condemnation be for a "public purpose."4 The difficulty with the
Washington public-use doctrine is that Washington case law includes
decisions on both sides of this theoretical fence. Early Washington
decisions applied the narrow definition of public use, but the Supreme
I. See Wash. Const art. I, § 16.
2. See Wash. Const. art I, § 16.
3. See infra Part LA.
4. See infra Part LA.
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Court of Washington later appeared to adopt a public-purpose analysis.5
During the early 1980s the court seemingly reverted to the narrow
standard.6
In State ex rel. Washington State Convention & Trade Center v. Evans
(Convention Center),7 the Supreme Court of Washington confronted the
issue of whether an exercise of eminent domain to procure land for a
facility containing a mixture of public and private elements would satisfy
the Washington public-use requirement. The land in question was a
proposed site for the construction of a facility that would expand the
exhibit space of the Washington State Convention and Trade Center
(Center).8 Because the new exhibit space would be limited to the fourth-
floor level of the new building, most of the space representing the three
floors below the exhibit area would remain empty.9 The Center's scheme
for this empty area was novel: a private company would pay fifteen
million dollars to own and develop the space for parking and retail.'0 The
Supreme Court of Washington asserted that the inclusion of this private
component in the expansion project did not compel the conclusion that
condemnation would not be for public use. Instead, the court
characterized the private development as "merely incidental" and held
that the proposed condemnation would not violate the Washington
public-use requirement."
This Note argues that the Supreme Court of Washington should have
explicitly adopted a public-purpose analysis and thereby eliminated
much of the confusion surrounding the public-use requirement in
Washington. Part I of this Note examines both the Washington case law
concerning public use and the approaches taken by the U.S. Supreme
Court and other state supreme courts. Part II explains the facts and
holding of the Convention Center opinion. Part III argues that the
Convention Center majority's approach to public use makes the already
inconsistent Washington doctrine even more unpredictable. Part IV argues
that the court should have explicitly adopted a public-purpose analysis.
5. See infra Part I.C.
6. See infra Part I.C.
7. 136 Wash. 2d 811, 966 P.2d 1252 (1998).
8. See id. at 814, 966 P.2d at 1253-54.
9. See id.
10. See id. at 815, 966 P.2d at 1254.
11. See id. at 822-23, 966 P.2d at 1258.
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I. THE PUBLIC-USE DOCTRINE
A. Competing Theories ofPublic Use
"Eminent domain" is the inherent power of government to take private
property subject to a constitutional limitation that the taking be for public
use. 2 The U.S. Constitution provides that "private property [shall not] be
taken for public use, without just compensation." 3 Most states have
similar constitutional provisions. 4 Obviously, the effect of such public-
use limitations on an exercise of eminent domain depends on the
definition of "public use."
Although it is generally agreed that the term "public use" is almost
incapable of precise definition, 5 two basic theories attempt to characterize
its meaning. The narrow approach characterizes public use as demanding
actual use by the public and requires that the public have an actual right to
use the condemned property. 6 An example of this theory is when the state
condemns land and then leases or sells it to a private business. Under the
narrow reading of the public-use requirement, this would be invalid
because, as a matter of right, the condemned property would not be subject
to access by the public. 7
The second theory defines public use more expansively as merely
requiring a public advantage or a public purpose. 8 Under this broad
approach, condemnation for a project that advances a legitimate public
purpose satisfies the public-use requirement regardless of whether the
condemned property is subject to public access. 9 An example of this
12. See Errol E. Meidinger, The "Public Uses" of Eminent Domain: History and Policy, I I Envtl.
L. 1, 2 (1980).
13. U.S. Const. amend. V.
14. See William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 Wash. L. Rev. 553, 554-
55 (1972); see also 2ANichols on Eminent Domain § 7.01[1], at 7-14 to 7-15 n.3 (rev. ed. 1999).
15. See New York City Hous. Auth. v. Muller, I N.E.2d 153, 155 (N.Y. 1936); State ex rel.
Tacoma Indus. Co. v. White River Power, 39 Wash. 648, 662, 82 P. 150, 151 (1905); 2A Nichols on
Eminent Domain, supra note 14, § 7.02[1], at 7-24.
16. See 2A Nichols on Eminent Domain, supra note 14, § 7.02[2], at 7-26 to 7-28.
17. See, e.g., Reed v. City of Seattle, 124 Wash. 185, 191, 213 P. 923, 925 (1923) (stating that
proposed lease of condemned property to private gas station did not represent public use); Neitzel v.
Spokane Int'l Ry. Co., 65 Wash. 100, 112-15, 117 P. 864, 868-69 (1911) (stating that lease of
condemned property to grocery business is private, and therefore impermissible, use).
18. See 2A Nichols on Eminent Domain, supra note 14, § 7.02[3], at 7-28 to 7-32; 17 William B.
Stoebuck, Washington Practice § 9.20, at 585 (1996).
19. See generally 2A Nichols on Eminent Domain, supra note 14, § 7.02[3], at 7-28 to 7-32.
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theory is an economic development program that condemns property
explicitly for the use of private business. Under a narrow public-use
theory, such a scheme would be invalid because it places condemned
property in private hands.20 However, from the perspective of a public-
purpose analysis, such an exercise of eminent domain could be justified.
The private use of the condemned land would be seen as a part of the
larger goal of strengthening the local economy.
2'
B. The Public-Use Requirement Outside of Washington
Although the history of the interpretation of public use in the United
States is one of confusion and oscillation between the two theories, most
American courts now apply a broad public-purpose definition of public
use. For a time after the American Revolution, courts were inclined to
view public use broadly. 2 During the middle to late nineteenth century,
however, the narrow view of public use had taken hold, although the
broad view was never completely eclipsed.23 By the middle of the twentieth
century, the broad public-purpose view had regained prominence.24
A principal example of the modem ascendancy of the public-purpose
analysis is in urban renewal. The general rationale of an urban-renewal
statute is to eliminate "slum" or "blighted" areas by replacing them with
private business or private residential developments.' Such projects
would be invalid under the narrow public-use theory because they put
condemned property to private use. However, the great majority of
American courts have approved condemnation actions for urban-renewal
projects under a broad public-use theory.26 For example, in Berman v.
20. See, e.g., Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 799, 837-39, 341 P.2d 171, 192-94 (1959)
(holding that condemnation for redevelopment project that would enhance regional industrial
economy is not public use). See infra Part I.C.2 for discussion of the Hogue decision.
21. See, e.g., Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981)
(upholding condemnation project that would provide condemned property to General Motors).
22. See Buckner F. Melton, Jr., Eminent Domain, "Public Use, " and the Conundrum of Original
Intent, 36 Nat. Resources J. 59, 84-85 (1996).
23. See Lawrence Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 Or. L. Rev. 203,
208-09 (1978).
24. See, e.g., 2A Nichols on Eminent Domain, supra note 14, § 7.02[5], at 7-34 to 7-35; Melton,
supra note 22, at 59; Laura Mansnerus, Note, Public Use, Private Use, and Judicial Review in
Eminent Domain, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 409,413 (1983).
25. See generally Note, State Constitutional Limitations on the Power of Eminent Domain, 77
Harv. L. Rev. 717, 725-27 (1964).
26. See 2A Nichols on Eminent Domain, supra note 14, § 7.06[26], at 7-168 n.265 for a complete
listing of states that have approved urban-renewal projects.
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Parker,27 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the elimination of blight
represents a public purpose, and as a result the legislatively mandated
mechanics of the project-the exercise of eminent domain and the sale of
the condemned properties to private developers-were irrelevant.28
Although not necessarily adopting the same sweeping language as
Berman, most states have reached the same result and have approved
condemnation for similar urban-renewal projects.29 Generally, state
courts have held that the condemnation was for public use by reasoning
that the sale of condemned lands to private interests was merely ancillary
to the public purpose of eliminating slum and blighted areas3
Many American courts now also apply a public-purpose analysis for
projects in circumstances outside the context of urban renewal. State
courts have approved projects for industrial parks and shopping centers
on the basis of a public-purpose analysis.3 At the federal level, the U.S.
Supreme Court has also applied a public-purpose analysis in non-urban-
renewal situations. In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff32 the Court
confronted a state land redistribution scheme that provided for the
condemnation of land and immediate transfer of tide to long-term tenants
living on the land.3 Explicitly rejecting the narrow definition of public
use, the Court asserted that "it is only the taking's purpose, and not its
mechanics, that must pass scrutiny under the Public Use Clause."'34 Thus,
under Midkiff, if the project's goal is within the ambit of the police
power-the power to provide for the public health, safety, and welfare-
then condemnation of property for such a project is for a public purpose
and consequently represents a "public use."
35
27. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
28. See id at 33-34.
29. See 2A Nichols on Eminent Domain, supra note 14, § 7.06[26][a], at 7-168 n.265.
30. See, e.g., Housing & Redevelopment Auth. v. Greenman, 96 N.W.2d 673, 680 (Minn. 1959);
Hunter v. Norfolk Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 78 S.E.2d 893, 899 (Va. 1953).
31. See, e.g., Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 458-60
(Mich. 1981) (holding that condemnation of entire neighborhood for General Motors assembly plant
satisfied Michigan public-use requirement); In re Minneapolis Community Dev. Agency, 582
N.W.2d 596, 598-601 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that condemnation for downtown retail and
parking development is public purpose).
32- 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
33. See id at 233-34.
34. Id at 244.
35. See id at 239-42.
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A minority of states have retained some form of narrow public-use
analysis. Only three state supreme courts have followed this logic and
invalidated urban-renewal statutes.36 Other state courts have also
occasionally applied the narrow public-use theory to invalidate exercises
of eminent domain for projects containing private elements outside the
realm of urban renewal.37
C. The Washington Public-Use Requirement
The Washington State Constitution mandates that property may be
taken from a private property owner only for public use. The Supreme
Court of Washington has struggled with the definition of public use for
almost one hundred years. Early decisions narrowly interpreted public
use and explicitly rejected a "public-purpose" analysis. 9 On the other
hand, during the 1960s and 1970s, the court flirted with a public-purpose
definition.4" However, in the 1980s the court retreated and returned to the
narrow definition.4 The result of the court's vacillation between these
two interpretations is a public-use doctrine that is contradictory and
difficult to apply.
1. Early Decisions
The early opinions of the Supreme Court of Washington interpreted
the public-use requirement narrowly and explicitly rejected the idea that
condemnation could be justified if it merely served a public purpose or
36. See Adams v. Housing Auth., 60 So. 2d 663, 670-71 (Fla. 1952); City of Atlanta v. Johnson,
74 S.E.2d 891, 894 (Ga. 1953); Edens v. City of Columbia, 91 S.E.2d 280, 285 (S.C. 1956).
However, it appears that only South Carolina has retained this position. The Supreme Court of
Florida later seemingly approved urban redevelopment. See Grubstein v. Urban Renewal Agency,
115 So. 2d 745, 750-51 (Fla. 1959). In Georgia, a 1954 constitutional amendment expressly
allowed urban redevelopment. See Allen v. City Council, 113 S.E.2d 621, 623-24 (Ga. 1960).
37. See, e.g., City of Little Rock v. Raines, 411 S.W.2d 486, 493-95 (Ark. 1967) (taking of
agricultural land for industrial development is not public use); City of Owensboro v. McCormick,
581 S.W.2d 3, 7-8 (Ky. 1979) (taking of nonblighted land for industrial development is not public
use); Opinion of the Justices, 131 A.2d 904, 906-07 (Me. 1957) (taking ofnonblighted property for
industrial development is not public use).
38. See Wash. Const. art. I, § 16.
39. See infra Part I.C.I.
40. See infra Part I.C.2-3.
41. See infra Part I.C.3.
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conferred a public benefit.42 However, the court did not ban all private
uses of condemned property. The court allowed a private use of
condemned property if the private use could be characterized as
"incidental."'43 The power-plant line of cases,' extending from 1906 until
1927, represents the court's early exposition on the meaning of its
"incidental" exception to the narrow public-use doctrine. The cases arose
because until 1927, the Supreme Court of Washington did not recognize
the use of condemned land for the production of electrical power for
private industry as a public use.4' Before that time, whenever a utility
would propose to condemn property for electricity production, the
question would arise whether the proposed facility would produce power
for purely public uses (such as municipal lighting) or whether electricity
would also be produced for private industry.
46
The general rule of the power-plant cases was a variation on the
narrow public-use theory: an inclusion of a private use of condemned
property in an otherwise public project would poison the entire project
unless the private use could either be characterized as "incidental" or
completely eliminated from the project. In State ex rel. Harris v. Superior
Court,47 the court asserted that "if a private use is combined with a public
one in such a way that the two cannot be separated, then unquestionably
42. See Healy Lumber Co. v. Morris, 33 Wash. 490, 509, 74 P. 681, 685 (1903) ("[T]he use under
consideration must be either a use by the public, or by some agency which is quasi public, and not
simply a use which may incidentally or indirectly promote the public interest or general prosperity or
the state."); see also Reed v. City of Seattle, 124 Wash. 185, 191, 213 P. 923, 925 (1923) (stating
that proposed lease of condemned property to private gas station did not represent public use);
Neitzel v. Spokane Int'l Ry. Co., 65 Wash. 100, 112-15, 117 P. 864, 868-69 (1911) (stating that
lease of condemned property to grocery business is private, and therefore impermissible, use).
43. See, e-g., City ofTacomav. Nisqually Power Co., 57 Wash. 420, 429-30, 107 P. 199,202(1910).
44. See State ex rel. Chelan Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 142 Wash. 270, 253 P. 115 (1927); State
ex rel. Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Superior Court, 133 Wash. 308, 233 P. 651 (1925); State
ex rel. S. Fork Log-Driving Co. v. Superior Court, 102 Wash. 460, 173 P. 192 (1918); State ex rel.
Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Wash. 84, 127 P. 591 (1912); State ex rel. Lyle
Light, Power & Water Co. v. Superior Court, 70 Wash. 486, 127 P. 104 (1912); City of Tacoma v.
Nisqually Power Co., 57 Wash. 420, 107 P. 199 (1910); State ex rel. Dominick v. Superior Court, 52
Wash. 196, 100 P. 317 (1909); State ex rel. Harris v. Olympia Light & Power Co., 46 Wash. 511, 90
P. 656 (1907); State ex rel. Harris v. Superior Court, 42 Wash. 660, 85 P. 666 (1906); State ex rel.
Harlan v. Centralia-Chehalis Elec. Ry. & Power Co., 42 Wash. 632, 85 P. 344 (1906); State ex rel.
Tacoma Indus. Co. v. White RiverPower Co., 39 Wash. 648,82 P. 150 (1905).
45. In 1927, the Supreme Court of Washington recognized production of electricity for private
industry as a public use of condemned land. See Chelan Elec. Co., 142 Wash. at 280-83, 253 P. at
119-20.
46. See generally cases cited in supra note 42.
47. 42 Wash. 660, 85 P. 666 (1906).
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the right of eminent domain [cannot] be invoked to aid the enterprise."48
Thus, if the public and private uses could be separated and the private
element removed, then eminent domain could be exercised to acquire
property for the remaining purely public use.49 On the other hand, if the
uses were not separable and were contained within a single facility, the
private use could still survive if it were "incidental." For example, in City
of Tacoma v. Nisqually Power Co.,5  the court held that a temporary sale
of seasonally produced excess power to private industry represented an
incidental private use.5 However, the determining factor in the power-
plant definition of "incidental" was the nature of the private use: the
private use was an "insignificant" and "temporary" disposal of an excess
product. 2 Furthermore, under the power-plant cases, a private use within
an otherwise public project was not incidental merely because it did not
require the condemnation of any additional property beyond what the
public component would alone require. 3 Instead, the court focused on
the transitory quality or the insignificance of the private use.54
2. Initial Modern Decisions: Hogue v. Port of Seattle and Miller v.
City of Tacoma
Hogue v. Port of Seattle55 and Miller v. City of Tacoma56 represent the
Supreme Court of Washington's first significant modem foray into the
public-use doctrine. In these cases, the court confronted the question of
public use in the general context of industrial redevelopment and urban
48. Id. at 665, 85 P. at 667 (citing State ex rel. Tacoma Indus. Co. v. White River Power Co., 39
Wash. 648, 82 P. 150 (1905)).
49. The Harris cases are an example of this principle in action. In State ex rel. Harris v. Superior
Court, the court held invalid a condemnation for a power plant that would produce power for both
private and public uses. See 42 Wash. at 668, 85 P. at 668. However, in State ex rel. Harris v.
Olympia Light & Power Co., the continuation of the first Harris case, the court approved the power
plant's amended, smaller, and purely public condemnation. See 46 Wash. at 512-13, 90 P. at 656.
50. 57 Wash. 420, 107 P. 199 (1910).
51. See id. at 429-30, 107 P. at 202.
52. See id. A further example of this is State ex rel. Puget Sound Power & Light v. Superior
Court, 133 Wash. 308, 309-10, 233 P. 651, 651-52 (1925), in which a power plant attempted to
condemn property for the production of power for both public and private uses. The court refused to
apply the incidental designation to the private use and invalidated the taking because the private use
would not be temporary or insignificant. See id. at 313-16, 233 P. at 653-54.
53. See Puget Power, 133 Wash. at 316-17, 233 P. at 654.
54. See id. at 313-16, 233 P. at 653-54; Nisqually Power, 57 Wash. at 429-30, 107 P. at 202.
55. 54 Wash. 2d 799, 341 P.2d 171 (1959).
56. 61 Wash. 2d 374, 378 P.2d 464 (1963).
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renewal; however, even after both decisions the implications of the two
opinions remained unclear. In Hogue, the legislature had granted the Port
of Seattle power to condemn properties for redevelopment and resale to
private industry." The Supreme Court of Washington held that the lands
in question were not "blighted" or "slums," and hence the project at issue
was not for urban renewal.58 The court squarely rejected the contention
that a project designed purely for industrial development could be
characterized as a public use: "In its practical operation, [the statutory
scheme] amounts to no more than the taking of A's property,... and
then placing it in the hands of B."' The court held that even though the
industrial redevelopment would have been beneficial to the City of
Seattle, such a resale of condemned property to private entities resulted
in an impermissible private use of condemned land."0 Thus, the Hogue
court's rejection of the public-purpose analysis is consistent with prior
Washington case law that narrowly interpreted the Washington public-
use requirement to demand actual use of the condemned property by the
public."
In Miller v. City of Tacoma,2 which came down three years after
Hogue, the Supreme Court of Washington held that certain "blighted"
lands could be condemned and resold to private entities for urban
renewal. 3 After noting that the Hogue decision did not apply to
"blighted" lands,' the court based its holding almost exclusively on other
jurisdictions' affirmation of urban-renewal statutes.65 The Miller court
did not follow the'rule that condemned property must be actually used by
57. See Hogue, 54 Wash. 2d at 810-11,341 P.2d at 177-78.
58. See id. at 825-27,341 P.2d at 186-87.
59. Id at 835, 341 P.2d at 191-92.
60. See id at 835-38, 341 P.2d at 192-93.
61. The result of Hogue as it specifically pertains to port districts was annulled by a later
amendment to the Washington Constitution declaring that the condemnation of land for industrial
development by a Port Authority is aperse public use. See Wash. Const. amend. 45. However, for
the broader holding that the public-use requirement is not satisfied merely because a project has a
public purpose and is in the public interest, Hogue has been subsequently cited by the Supreme
Court of Washington as good law. See In re City of Seattle, 96 Wash. 2d 616, 627, 638 P.2d 549,
556 (1981).
62. 61 Wash. 2d 374,378 P.2d 464 (1963).
63. See id at 387-88, 378 P.2d at 472-73.
64. See id at 377-78, 378 P.2d at 466- 67.
65. See id at 387-88, 378 P.2d at 472-73; see also Charles E. Watts, Note, Eminent Domain:
Urban Renewal Statute Held Constitutional, 39 Wash. L. Rev. 206,207-08 (1964).
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the public.66 Instead, by relying on public-purpose precedents such as
Berman v. Parker,67 the court demonstrated an acceptance of a public-
purpose model at least within the context of urban renewal.68
3. The Second Wave of Modern Decisions: Port of Seattle and
Westlake
In the wake of Miller, the Washington public-use doctrine could have
proceeded in either of two directions. The Miller decision could have
been viewed as a specific exception for urban renewal to the narrow
public-use rule. Alternatively, Miller could have represented a watershed
in the Washington public-use doctrine as the first step toward the
adoption of a public-purpose analysis. Confusingly, the post-Miller cases
vacillate between both points of view.
In In re Port of Seattle,69 the Supreme Court of Washington applied a
public-purpose analysis. In that case, the legislature authorized the
condemnation of land for the construction of air cargo facilities at
Seattle-Tacoma International Airport.7" However, the proposed facilities
were to be leased to private air cargo companies.7' Citing Miller, the
court stated that "[a]s long as the object sought to be accomplished is for
a public purpose, it is for the legislature to determine the means to
accomplish it. ''72 In addition to noting that air cargo facilities are an
integral part of the operation of an airport, the court characterized the
private leasing of such facilities as "incidental..-"The fact that private
enterprise may be selected to effectuate the plan for providing air cargo
facilities does not make the purpose of providing those facilities a private
one. The subsequent lease of the facilities to private enterprise is
incidental to the main public purpose."73
66. See 17 Stoebuck, supra note 18, § 9.20, at 586-88.
67. See Miller, 61 Wash. 2d at 387-88, 378 P.2d at 472-73.
68. See Reginald K. Cullitan, Comment, Inverse Condemnation in Washington State: A Survey of
Judicial History Defining Public Rights in Private Property, 16 Gonz. L. Rev. 385, 393-95 (1981);
Watts, supra note 65, at 207- 08.
69. 80 Wash. 2d 392,495 P.2d 327 (1972).
70. See id. at 393-94, 495 P.2d at 329.
71. See id.





In In re City of Seattle (Westlake), 4 which came down nine years after
Port of Seattle, the Supreme Court of Washington refused to apply the
public-purpose analysis of Miller and Port of Seattle. In Westlake, the
City of Seattle proposed to condemn property for a downtown project
that would include public spaces, an art museum, parking facilities, and a
retail shopping center.75 As a result, a portion of the condemned property
was to be leased to private tenants for retail purposes.76 Citing Hogue, the
Westlake court specifically stated that an exercise of eminent domain
may not be characterized as for public use unless the use is "really
public" and that it is insufficient if the condemnation is merely in the
public interest." Furthermore, the Westlake court treated Miller as an
exception, and dismissed it from the analysis by noting that the Westlake
project was not for urban renewal."
The power-plant cases provided primary support for the Westlake
holding, resurrected by the Westlake court after fifty years of slumber.79
Citing State ex rel. Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Superior Court,
the Westlake court reasoned:
If a private use is combined with a public use in such a way that the
two cannot be separated, the right of eminent domain cannot be
invoked.
Therefore, where the purpose of a proposed acquisition is to
acquire property and devote only a portion of it to truly public uses,
the remainder to be rented or sold for private use, the project does
not constitute public use. 0
Applying this power-plant standard, the Westlake court noted that the
trial court had found that the private retail elements of the project
represented "a substantial element of the project, essential to its
functioning."'" The Westlake court concluded that the project was not a
public use: "Were the retailing functions only incidental to those [public]
74. 96 Wash. 2d 616, 638 P.2d 549 (1981).
75. See id at 623-24, 638 P.2d at 554.
76. See id
77. See id. at 627, 638 P.2d at 556.
78. See id. at 625, 638 P.2d at 555.
79. See id at 627, 638 P.2d at 556.
80. Id (citing State m. rel. Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Superior Court, 133 Wash. 308,
233 P. 51 (1925)) (other citations omitted).
81. Id. at 628, 638 P.2d at 556.
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uses, a different question would be presented. However, the evidence
shows, as the trial court found, that the primary purpose of the
undertaking was to promote the retail goal. 82 In dissent, two justices
attacked the majority's opinion for its reliance on the power-plant cases
and stated that the court had silently overruled Miller and Port of
Seattle.
83
II. STATE ex rel. WASHINGTON STATE CONVENTION & TRADE
CENTER v. EVANS
A. Facts and Procedural History
In 1995, the Washington State Legislature approved $111.7 million
for expansion of the exhibit space of the Washington State Convention
and Trade Center (the Center) in downtown Seattle.' The Legislature
conditioned these funds on the Center's securing fifteen million dollars
in private or outside governmental funding.85 The Center considered two
principal alternatives for the site of the expansion. The first involved an
expansion to the east that would have required the closure of the Center's
operations for at least six months.86 The second alternative, an expansion
northward, held intriguing possibilities. The north end of the existing
exhibit space sits four stories above street level." Because an expansion
would necessarily be at the same elevation as the existing exhibit area,
the three stories underneath the proposed northward expansion would be
surplus space.88 This creation of surplus space was decisive: the Center
chose the north alternative and planned to sell the surplus to a private
developer and thus raise the fifteen million dollars required by the
Legislature.89
After examining private development proposals, the Center settled on
an agreement with the R.C. Hedreen Company (Hedreen). 0 Under the
82. Id. at 629, 638 P.2d at 557.
83. See id. at 635, 637-38, 638 P.2d at 560-62 (Utter, J., dissenting).
84. See State ti rel. Wash. State Convention & Trade Ctr. v. Evans, 136 Wash. 2d 811, 814, 966
P.2d 1252, 1253-54 (1998).
85. See id.
86. See id. at 814, 966 P.2d at 1254.
87. See id.





agreement, Hedreen would build the outer shell of the entire structure
and develop the surplus space for retail and parking facilities.9 Hedreen
would also contribute the required fifteen million dollars for the
development rights and in return take fee simple title to the lower three
stories of the new structure.92
Acting in accord with the Hedreen agreement, the Center began
condemnation proceedings to acquire the land in the north expansion
area.93 The property owners resisted, arguing that the condemnation
violated the public-use requirement for an exercise of eminent domain.'
But trial court ruled in favor of the Center, finding the expansion a public
use.95 The property owners appealed and were granted direct review by
the Supreme Court of Washington."
B. The Majority's Public-Use Analysis
The Supreme Court of Washington, in a seven-to-two decision,
affirmed the trial court, holding that the condemnation of properties for
the north expansion satisfied the public-use requirement for an exercise
of eminent domain.97 The court characterized the private development of
the surplus space as "merely incidental" and therefore not a violation of
the constitutional prohibition against taking property for private use.98
Citing power-plant cases, the Convention Center majority asserted
that the constitutional prohibition against the taking of land for private
use is not applicable if the private use does not "corrupt" the project's
public nature but is instead "merely incidental." 99 They distinguished
Westlake by holding that unlike Westlake, the Hedreen development
would not represent a "primary purpose" of the project."° The majority
also distinguished Westlake by focusing on the independence of the
91. See id.
92. See id
93. See id at 815, 966 P.2d at 1254.
94. See id
95. See id at 816, 966 P.2d at 1254.
96. See id at 816, 966 P.2d at 1255.
97. See id at 824-25, 966 P.2d at 1259. The court also analyzed the requirement of necessity in a
condemnation action. See id at 823-24, 966 P.2d at 1258-59. This Note focuses on the court's
public-use analysis and does not consider the question of necessity.
98. See id at 822-23, 966 P.2d at 1258.
99. See id at 817, 966 P.2d at 1255.
100. See id at 819-21, 966 P.2d at 1256-57.
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public exhibit space in the Convention Center expansion from the private
Hedreen development.' The court stated that the "retail development of
the floors beneath the expansion in no way affects its functioning as an
exhibit space."'' 0 2 The court reasoned that absent the private development
the expansion could still be built and the exhibit space would not be
altered-the only result would be that the lower three stories would lie
vacant.'O3
The majority's public-use analysis then addressed the Westlake
statement that public and private uses may not be "combined... in such
a way that the two cannot be separated.""' After noting that this
requirement originated in the power-plant cases, the court held that
unlike those decisions, the expansion project did not contain inseparably
combined public and private uses in a single facility.'0 5 The Convention
Center court focused on how the private and public uses in the expansion
project would be physically separated and asserted that the uses would
inhabit "distinct facilities" and thus would not be commingled. 6
According to the court, "[t]he expansion project contemplates a wholly
public facility stacked above a wholly private development."'0 7 Thus, the
expansion would not be a single facility, but rather, "two entirely
separate facilities, one wholly public, the other wholly private."'0 8
The majority's public-use analysis finally turned to the question of
whether the Hedreen development could be characterized as "merely
incidental." The court reasoned that "[i]f the anticipated public use alone
would require taking no less property than the government seeks to
condemn, then the condemnation is for the purpose of a public use and
any private use is incidental."'09 Applying this test to the facts, the court
concluded that the Hedreen development would be incidental because the
"footprint" of the new exhibit space-the public use--"spans the entire
property to be condemned.""' The majority deemed the Hedreen
101. See id. at 820-21, 966 P.2d at 1256-57.
102. Id. at 820, 966 P.2d at 1256.
103. See id.
104. Id. at 820-23, 966 P.2d at 1257-58 (quoting In re City of Seattle, 96 Wash. 2d 616, 627,
P.2d 549, 556 (1981)).
105. See id. at 820-21, 966 P.2d at 1257.
106. See id. at 822, 966 P.2d at 1258.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 821, 966 P.2d at 1257.
109. Id. at 822, 966 P.2d at 1258.
110. Id. at 822-23, 966 P.2d at 1258.
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development incidental because without it the expansion would require
taking no less property than if the Hedreen development were
included."' As a consequence, the majority held that the inclusion of the
Hedreen development would not invalidate an exercise of eminent
domain on behalf of the project."2
C. Justice Sanders'Dissent
In a lengthy dissent joined by Justice Madsen, Justice Sanders
attacked the majority's characterization of the Hedreen development as
an incidental use and argued that the expansion project represents an
example of excess condemnation." 3 According to Justice Sanders, the
teaching of the power-plant cases is not limited to single-facility
situations."4 Instead, he asserted that the power-plant cases held that an
incidental use must be ancillary and dependent on the principal public
use."5 Applying this rule to the Hedreen development in the expansion
project, he wrote that "the private use at issue here is not 'incidental' to
the convention hall use in the sense that the private use is in any way
ancillary to, the product of, or otherwise related to the public use of the
exhibit hall facility above it.""11
6
Im. THE CONVENTION CENTER COURT FURTHER CONFUSED
THE WASHINGTON PUBLIC-USE DOCTRINE
After the Convention Center opinion, the Washington public-use
requirement is more unpredictable than ever. The Convention Center
outcome is inconsistent with narrow public-use concepts from both the
power-plant decisions and the Westlake decision. Furthermore, although
the specific result of Convention Center is consistent with the public-
purpose approach of Miller and Port of Seattle, aspects of the Convention
Center court's reasoning conflict with the basic precepts of a public-
purpose analysis. The result is a public-use doctrine that is extremely
difficult to apply.
111. Seeid
112. See id; see also id at 824-25,966 P.2d at 1259.
113. See id at 825-45, 966 P.2d at 1259-69 (Sanders, J., dissenting). See also Part V.C for
discussion ofJustice Sanders' contentions concerning excess condemnation.
114. See generally id at 833-36, 966 P.2d at 1263-65 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
115. See id at 834-35, 966 P.2d at 1263-64 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
116. Id at 835,966 P.2d at 1264 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
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A. The Convention Center Decision Is at Odds with the Narrow
Public-Use Doctrine of the Power-Plant and Westlake Decisions
1. The Convention Center Opinion Misconstrues the Meaning of the
Power-Plant Decisions and Contravenes Their Logic
The Convention Center majority borrowed from the power-plant cases
the essential tenet of its decision: an exercise of eminent domain for an
otherwise-public project that contains an "incidental" private use does
not violate the Washington public-use requirement." 7 The Convention
Center majority also analyzed the power-plant cases in the context of the
Westlake statement that eminent domain may not be exercised for a
project in which public and private uses are "combined... in such a way
that the two cannot be separated.""' 8 This analysis resulted from the
Convention Center court's recognition that the Westlake court borrowed
this "separation test" from the power-plant decisions." 9 However, the
Convention Center majority's reasoning and its application of the power-
plant cases was flawed because the majority misconstrued the separation
test and applied a definition of "incidental" that is inconsistent with the
power-plant approach.
The majority's application of the power-plant test-that private and
public uses cannot be "combined... in such a way that they cannot be
separated"-was inconsistent with the test's meaning in the power-plant
decisions. In Convention Center, the majority reasoned that the
expansion project would not violate this separation test because, unlike
the situation in the power-plant cases, the public and private uses in the
expansion project would inhabit distinct spaces. 2 ' However, in the
power-plant cases the Supreme Court of Washington applied the
separation test in a different manner. In those decisions, if the public and
private uses were separable, then condemnation for the project failed
unless the private use was stricken from the project.' 2' Under a true
power-plant analysis, the Convention Center majority's finding that the
private and public uses in the expansion project were "separable" should
117. See id. at 817, 966 P.2d at 1255.
118. Id. at 820-23, 966 P.2d at 1257-58.
119. See id. at 820, 966 P.2d at 1257.
120. See id. at 822, 966 P.2d at 1258.
121. See supra Part I.C.I.
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have resulted in condemnation's being approved only on the condition of
the Hedreen development's removal.
Moreover, the Convention Center majority's analysis of the power-
plant decisions was flawed in its characterization of what private uses of
condemned land the power-plant courts would have found acceptable as
"incidental." The majority asserted that the power-plant decisions
"attempted to discern whether the project was of a predominantly public
or private nature'' and that in the power-plant cases "some private use
of condemned land [was] permissible as long as the private use [was] not
itself the impetus for the condemnation."'" The majority stated that "[i]n
effect, the [power-plant] court[s] examined whether the public use alone
was sufficient to justify the condemnation."124 However, the power-plant
courts were not as permissive as these statements would suggest. If an
exercise of eminent domain for a project that contained a private use was
to survive in the power-plant cases, the private use in question was
required to be either insignificant or, more importantly, temporary."z For
a power-plant court, the issue was not the primary use or the "impetus."
Instead, the question was whether the particular sale of excess power was
only a small, short-lived expedient In the power-plant cases, the Supreme
Court of Washington specifically rejected arguments that a permanent
private use was acceptable merely because it required no extra condem-
nation beyond what the project's public use would alone require. 26
Applying this analysis, the private use in the Convention Center
expansion project would not have been seen by a power-plant court as an
acceptable "incidental" use of condemned property. The Hedreen
development is neither insignificant nor short-lived, and the court's
belief that the inclusion of the Hedreen development required the
condemnation of no additional property would not have saved the
development Thus, the majority's interpretation of the power-plant cases
represents yet another level of confusion in the Washington public-use
requirement because the very cases on which the Convention Center
majority relies for the essential concept of "incidental" would have
approached that concept in a fundamentally different manner.
122. Convention Center, 136 Wash. 2d at 821, 966 P.2d at 1257.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See supra Part LC.1.
126. See supra Part LC.I.
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2. Distinguishing Convention Centerfrom Westlake Is Problematic
and Creates Much Confusion
The Westlake and Convention Center projects had much in common,
and as a result the divergent outcomes of the two cases create more
confusion in the Washington public-use doctrine. The Westlake court
applied a variety of formulae in deciding that the private elements in the
Westlake project were not "incidental" and would thus cause condem-
nation for the project to violate the public-use requirement. For example,
the Westlake court noted that the trial court had found that the retail
element in Westlake represented a "substantial element" of the project
that was "essential to [the project's] functioning."' 27 Moreover, the
Westlake court concluded that the Westlake project was "predominantly
private" and that the private use represented the project's "primary
purpose."'28 The Westlake court stated that when "the purpose of a
proposed acquisition is to acquire property and devote only a portion of it
to truly public uses, the remainder to be rented or sold for private use, the
project does not constitute public use."' 29
Because the Convention Center project has many of the same
fundamental characteristics as the Westlake project, it is difficult to
distinguish the two. Just as the Convention Center project concerns a
public and private facility in a single structure, 30 the Westlake scheme
included, among other things, the construction of a new structure that
would have contained public museum space in its upper floors and
private retail and parking facilities in its lower floors.'' If in Westlake
the use of only a "portion," rather than all, of the property for "truly
public" uses poisoned the project, a similar result should have followed
in Convention Center. Moreover, the private development in the
Convention Center project would occupy a majority of the project's
developed space.' Thus, it is difficult to argue that the Convention
Center private development should not be considered a "substantial
element" of the overall project.
127. In re City of Seattle, 96 Wash. 2d 616, 628, 638 P.2d 549, 556 (1981).
128. Id. at 629, 638 P.2d at 557.
129. Id. at 627-28, 638 P.2d at 556.
130. See State ex rel. Wash. State Convention & Trade Ctr. v. Evans, 136 Wash. 2d 811, 814-15,
966 P.2d 1252, 1254 (1998).
131. See Westlake, 96 Wash. 2d at 623-24, 638 P.2d at 554-55.
132. See Convention Center, 136 Wash. 2d at 824,966 P.2d at 1258.
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The Convention Center court's attempts to distinguish Westlake are
strained. The Convention Center majority asserted that, unlike the
situation in Westlake, the Hedreen development would be an
independent, "separable component" that does not affect the functioning
of the exhibit hall expansion."' This is unpersuasive, especially
considering that the entire project is dependent on Hedreen's
contribution of the legislatively required fifteen million dollars.
Additionally, the Convention Center court's statement that the Hedreen
development is merely "a means to an end"'34 is not compelling: the
private retail development in Westlake could also be seen as merely a
"means" to the public "end" of creating a downtown focal point.
The inconsistency between Westlake and Convention Center creates
bewildering complexity in the Washington public-use doctrine. Because
these decisions represent the court's two most recent opinions on the
subject, future public-use questions will presumably be litigated
primarily on the basis of their reasoning. When viewed together,
Westlake and Convention Center present a confusing array of tests for
deciding when a private element poisons an exercise of eminent domain
for a project: "primary purpose," "essential to the functioning,"
"separable component," "means to an end, .... independence," "not affect
the functioning," "predominantly private," "not combined so they cannot
be separated," and so on. The combination of these ideas represents an
unpredictable doctrine that yields different results depending on which
catchphrase one happens to emphasize. Moreover, the Convention Center
decision does not help in balancing the formulae when they are in
conflict: we have no idea which concepts are most important.
B. The Convention Center Opinion's Mixed Signals Regarding Miller
and Port of Seattle Create Even More Confusion
The Supreme Court of Washington's decisions in Port of Seattle and
Miller applied a public-purpose analysis.' As such, they represent a
different approach from the power-plant decisions and the Westlake
opinion, each of which used a narrow public-use approach.'36 However,
just as Convention Center is in tension with the narrow public-use cases,
133. See id. at 820, 966 P.2d at 1256-57.
134. I at 820, 966 P.2d at 1257.
135. See supra Part I.C.2-3.
136. See supra Part LC.1, 3.
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difficulties also arise when comparing Convention Center with the
public-purpose decisions of Miller and Port of Seattle.
Some aspects of the Convention Center opinion are inconsistent with a
public-purpose analysis. In Convention Center, the court repeatedly
based its reasoning on the independence of the public use-the exhibit
hall-from the private retail development and on the idea that the two
uses represent physically separate, dual facilities.'37 These ideas of
independence and physical separation are inconsistent with a public-
purpose analysis that justifies private uses as long as they are a part of a
broader public goal.'38 In Port of Seattle, the air cargo facilities were an
integral part of the airport operation,'39 and private redevelopment is an
essential element of urban-renewal projects such as the one adjudicated
in Miller. Therefore, when the Convention Center majority justifies the
private element in the expansion project because it will be independent
and physically separate from the public element, the court is applying a
concept that is alien to a public-purpose analysis.
On the other hand, some elements of the Convention Center opinion
are entirely consistent with the public-purpose view of Miller and Port of
Seattle. For example, the Convention Center court states that "Hedreen's
participation is a means to an end, but it is not an end in and of itself."'"
This sentence summarizes the public-purpose analysis in a nutshell:
public ends justify private means. Furthermore, the Convention Center
court made no effort to repudiate either Miller or Port of Seattle-
although the Port of Seattle decision was ignored, the first citation in the
court's public-use analysis was to Miller.4'
The result is that Convention Center neither adopted nor repudiated
the public-purpose analysis of Miller and Port of Seattle. Thus, not only
is the Convention Center opinion in conflict with the narrow public-use
ideas of the power-plant decisions and Westlake, it also does not resolve
how Miller and Port of Seattle fit into the court's concept of public use.
137. See, e.g., Convention Center, 136 Wash. 2d at 820, 822, 966 P.2d at 1256, 1258.
138. See supra Part LA.
139. See In re Port of Seattle, 80 Wash. 2d 392, 397,495 P.2d 327, 331 (1972).
140. Convention Center, 136 Wash. 2d at 820, 966 P.2d at 1257.
141. See id. at 816, 966 P.2d at 1255.
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IV. THE CONVENTION CENTER COURT SHOULD HAVE
EXPLICITLY ADOPTED A PUBLIC-PURPOSE ANALYSIS
In Convention Center, the court should have adopted a public-purpose
analysis for the Washington public-use requirement. Had the court done
so, it could have reached the same specific result and adopted a
predictable public-use doctrine that would be consistent with that of the
majority of states and the U.S. Supreme Court. Furthermore, a public-
purpose analysis would conform with the language of the Washington
Constitution. In particular, the Washington Constitution states:
Private property shall not be taken for private use .... Whenever
an attempt is made to take private property for a use alleged to be
public, the question whether the contemplated use be really public
shall be a judicial question, and determined as such, without regard
to any legislative assertion that the use is public.'42
This statement does not define "public use." Therefore, if the Supreme
Court of Washington wishes to define "public use" as "public purpose,"
the court is free to do so."
A. Public-Purpose Analysis Would Be More Predictable, Consistent
with the View Taken by Other Jurisdictions, and Responsive to
Public Needs
1. A Public-Purpose Analysis Would Be More Predictable
In the wake of Convention Center, practical application of the
Washington public-use requirement will be difficult. The court's various
formulae make it problematic to predict how the court will view the next
case that concerns a project involving both public and private uses.'"
The court's explicit adoption of a public-purpose analysis would have
significantly enhanced the predictability of its future decisions. The
question of public use, rather than being a nearly metaphysical weighing
of numerous tests and formulae, would instead focus on a single issue:
whether the goal of the condemnation in question represents a public
purpose. This does not mean that a public-purpose analysis could be used
142. Wash. Const. art. I, § 16.
143. See Stoebuck, supra note 18, § 9.20, at 589.
144. See supra Part ILA-B.
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mechanically; however, it would at least enable judges and attorneys to
grasp and think intelligently about the basic theory.
The adoption of a public-purpose analysis would be consistent with
the court's approach in Miller and Port of Seattle. Consequently,
adopting such an analysis would not introduce a new test, but rather
would ground Washington's eminent domain law on the foundation
established by those decisions. Furthermore, an explicit adoption of a
public-purpose analysis would be beneficial because it would require
overruling the court's narrow public-use decisions-Westlake and the
power-plant cases that supported the Westlake decision. The power-plant
cases are over seventy years old and represent a unique situation
concerning disposal of excess electricity in the context of Washington's
early hydropower industry.'45 In the twenty-first century, the Supreme
Court of Washington should not be beholden in its analysis to such
unique, aged decisions.
In Miller and Port of Seattle, the court had evinced an acceptance of the
public-purpose analysis, a trend that mirrored the rest of the nation. The
Westlake decision, by reaching back to the early 1900s and resurrecting the
power-plant cases, was a retreat from that progress. Fundamentally, the
Convention Center court should have stopped the confusion created by
Westlake. Instead of merely distinguishing Westlake and clouding the
meaning of the underlying power-plant decisions, the court simply should
have recognized that Westlake was a mistake, reestablished the analysis of
Miller and Port of Seattle, and moved on.
2. A Public-Purpose Analysis Would Be Consistent with That of Other
Jurisdictions
Had the Supreme Court of Washington adopted a public-purpose
analysis in Convention Center, it would have brought Washington in line
with the approach taken by the U.S. Supreme Court and most other state
supreme courts concerning the issue of public use.'46 This would have
had the salutary effect of allowing the Supreme Court of Washington to
consider input from similar cases from other jurisdictions, rather than
being stuck with managing a distinctive doctrine only by reference to
Washington decisions. Significantly, neither the Convention Center
majority nor the Westlake majority cited a single non-Washington case in
145. See supra Part I.C.1.
146. See supra Part I.B.
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their public-use analyses. In some legal areas, this isolation may be
satisfactory because the court has opportunities to continually revisit a
particular doctrine and fully develop it. However, in the realm of the
public-use doctrine, the Supreme Court of Washington on average hears
one major case every ten years.'4 7 Therefore, it would be helpful to the
court (and to practicing lawyers) if, when a particular public-use question
is under consideration, a broader range of authorities could be
meaningfully surveyed rather than the few scattered Washington decisions.
3. A Public-Purpose Analysis Would Be Responsive to Public Needs
and Would Not Threaten Private Property
A public-purpose analysis would be sensitive to public needs and
would not endanger private property. The analysis would permit public-
private partnerships in major projects that involve condemnation. This
flexibility is particularly important in urban areas where public and
private entities inhabit the same downtown space. Moreover, the public-
purpose approach does not unduly threaten private property because the
private landowner is still entitled to compensation for his condemned
property. 14' For example, in the Convention Center situation, a jury
awarded the contesting property owners almost thirty-seven million
dollars for the condemned property at issue.'49 This is almost twice what
the properties owners were originally offered. 5' This compensation,
especially when set by a citizen jury, is a powerful disincentive against
abuse of the eminent domain power.
B. An Exercise ofEminent Domain for the Convention Center Project
Would Have Been Consistent with a Public-Purpose Analysis
In Convention Center, the Hedreen development's revenue generation
was its only connection with the expansion project. By the majority's
own analysis, the Hedreen development represented a separate facility
147. Note the dates of the court's recent major public-use decisions: State ex rel. Washington
State Convention & Trade Center v. Evans, 136 Wash. 2d 811, 966 P.2d 1252 (1998); In re City of
Seattle, 96 Wash. 2d 616, 638 P.2d 549 (1981); In rePort of Seattle, 80 Wash. 2d 392,495 P.2d 327
(1972); Miller v. City of Tacoma, 61 wash. 2d 374, 378 P.2d 464 (1963); Hogue v. Port of Seattle,
54 Wash. 2d 799,341 P.2d 171 (1959).
148. See Wash. Const. art. I, § 16.
149. See Landowners Win Big Jury Award, Seattle Times, Mar. 24, 1999, at B2.
150. See id
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that would not affect the functioning of the exhibit hall."'I Furthermore,
the majority specifically stated that the project could be physically built
and operated without the inclusion of the Hedreen development.'52 Thus,
the Hedreen development's only contribution toward the project was
revenue generation. In all other respects, the Hedreen development
represented a distinct entity.
Under a public-purpose analysis, private use of condemned land may
be justified if it furthers a public purpose.'53 Therefore, the issue in
Convention Center under a public-purpose analysis would be whether a
private use within a physical structure that otherwise contains public uses
can be justified if the private use's exclusive contribution is revenue
generation for the project as a whole. A leading case on this issue is
Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port of New York Authority. 54 Operating
under a broad public-purpose analysis, the New York Court of Appeals
confronted the specific question of the effect of the lease of "portions" of
the World Trade Center to businesses solely for the purpose of
generating income to finance the project.' The court held that just as the
World Trade Center itself represented a public purpose, activities that
generated income for the World Trade Center also represented a public
purpose.
56
A Courtesy Sandwich Shop public-purpose analysis could easily apply
to the Convention Center problem. The expansion of the Convention
Center represents a public purpose, and as a result the Hedreen
development also represents a public purpose because it generates
revenue for the expansion and is a part of the facility built for the
otherwise-public expansion. Thus, condemnation for the project would
be justified under a public-purpose analysis because both the public and
private elements in the project would represent public purposes.
151. See Convention Center, 136 Wash. 2d at 820, 966 P.2d at 1256-57.
152. See id.
153. See supra Part I.A.
154. 190 N.E.2d 402 (N.Y. 1963).
155. See id. at 405-06.
156. See id. at 405. However, a Courtesy Sandwich Shop analysis extends only to a private,
revenue-producing use that is a part of a larger public facility. Thus, condemnation of additional land
for revenue production beyond what the public use requires alone would probably not be justified
under the Courtesy Sandwich Shop analysis. See id.
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C. A Public-Purpose Analysis Would Have Allowed the Majority to
Respond to Justice Sanders' Excess-Condemnation Arguments
In his dissent, Justice Sanders argued that the Convention Center
situation was an example of excess condemnation.'57 Essentially, Justice
Sanders reasoned that the Convention Center project did not require the
taking of the entire fee interest.'58 Instead, the public element of the
project-the exhibit hall expansion-would merely require the
condemnation of the space the exhibit hall would actually inhabit along
with any necessary easements.'59 The condemnation of the space
underneath, which would not be needed for public use, thus represented a
taking in excess of what the public exhibit hall needed." °
Justice Sanders' argument derives power from the majority's
insistence that the Hedreen development is an independent entity. In the
majority's analysis, the entire project is a "wholly public facility stacked
above a wholly private development"'' and the Hedreen development
does not "affect [the] ... functioning" of the exhibit hall. 62 The result is
an enormously difficult question concerning whether the taking of a fee
interest for a structure that contains an independent, private entity
represents excess condemnation.
A public-purpose approach would avoid the issue of excess
condemnation. Under a Courtesy Sandwich Shop analysis, a private use
within a facility containing both public and private elements itself
represents a public purpose because it generates revenue for the facility's
157. See Convention Center, 136 Wash. 2d at 836-45, 966 P.2d at 1265-69 (Sanders, J.,
dissenting). See also the following for more research on the general issue of excess condemnation:
2A Nichols on Eminent Domain, supra note 14, § 7.06[7], at 7-128 to 7-140; Andrew Bechard, A
Comparison of U.S.-Canadian Excess Condemnation, Expropriation, and Property Taking, 9 In
Pub. Interest 3 (1989); Robert E. Capron, Excess Condemnation in California-A Further
Expansion of the Right to Take, 20 Hastings L.J. 571 (1969); Robert H. Freilich & Stephen P. Chinn,
Transportation Corridors: Shaping and Financing Urbanization Through Integration of Eminent
Domain, Zoning and Growth Management Techniques, 55 UMKC L. Rev. 153 (1987); Comment,
Excess Condemnation-To Take or Not to Take-A Functional Analysis, 15 N.Y. L.F. 119 (1969);
Gary P. Johnson, Comment, The Effect of the Public Use Requirement on Excess Condemnation, 48
Tenn. L. Rev. 370 (1981); E.L. Strobin, Annotation, Right to Condemn Property in Excess of Needs
fora Particular Public Purpose, 6 A.L.R.3d 297 (1966).
158. See Convention Center, 136 Wash. 2d at 841,966 P.2d at 1267 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
159. See id (Sanders, J., dissenting).
160. See id (Sanders, J., dissenting).
161. d at 822, 966 P.2d at 1256.
162. Id at 820, 966 P.2d at 1256-57.
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overall public purpose. 63 Therefore, under the public-purpose analysis,
the condemnation of the entire fee interest may be justified because the
condemnation of both the space for the exhibit hall and the space for the
Hedreen development would be for public use. Condemnation for the
former would be for public use because an exhibit hall serves a public
purpose, and condemnation for the latter would be for public use because
generating revenue for the exhibit hall also serves a public purpose.
Thus, excess condemnation would not enter the equation because the
entire property would have been taken for a public purpose.
V. CONCLUSION
In the wake of Convention Center, the Washington public-use
requirement is in chaos because it contains a perplexing array of tests for
deciding when a private element poisons an exercise of eminent domain
for a project: "primary purpose," "essential to the functioning,"
"separable component," "means to an end," "independence," "not affect
[the] functioning," "predominantly private," and "not combined so they
cannot be separated." As a result, the Washington public-use requirement
remains unpredictable and impossible. to apply consistently. In
Convention Center, the Supreme Court of Washington missed an
opportunity to return to the public-purpose definition of public use that it
had previously embraced in Miller and Port of Seattle. Had the court
done so, it could have reached the same result and adopted a predictable
theory consistent with that applied in other U.S. jurisdictions. Instead, the
Washington public-use requirement remains in disarray.
163. See Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 190 N.E.2d 402,405 (N.Y. 1963).
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